T he emergence of the H1N1 influenza pandemic in spring 2009 stimulated the three North West Critical Care Networks (Cheshire and Mersey, Greater Manchester and Lancashire and South Cumbria) to develop a Northwest-wide phased escalation plan ( Table 1) to optimise collective critical care bed capacity in preparation for an anticipated surge of critically ill patients. However, this plan only ever reached 'stage 0' (surveillance) in the North West region during the first surge of H1N1 activity in the UK, but the plan was accepted by NHS North West as the standard plan for future escalation crises involving critical care.
During November 2010, a number of critically ill patients with H1N1 infection started to emerge throughout the North West and this was reported to NHS North West. Ultimately, this triggered the initiation of a Gold Command and Control Structure being imposed on North West NHS organisations (Figure 1 ) and daily teleconferences hosted by NHS North West for the five Gold Commands and the three Critical Care Networks. Stage 0 of the NHS North West H1N1 Influenza Critical Care Guidance (2010) escalation plan was initiated, during which H1N1 case surveillance was facilitated by the Intensive Care Bed Information Service defining the numbers of patients with confirmed and suspected H1N1 infection in critical care beds across the North West on a daily basis, in addition to its usual function of collecting data about numbers of inter-hospital critical care transfers and critical care bed states. This data was crucially important in informing escalation decisions as the outbreak evolved.
The Critical Care Networks were considered experts in interpreting H1N1 patient data, which together with Critical Care Networks' local knowledge informed timely escalation decision making. The Critical Care Networks were uniquely positioned to undertake this role because of their established relationships with the key players involved in the Gold Command and Control structured as detailed in Figure 1 . Furthermore, the Critical Care Networks played a vital role in communicating escalation decisions to their Trusts and critical care units. This was particularly important because very often management and non-critical care clinical staff were ignorant of the severe pressure being experienced by critical care units during this crisis and were in many cases single-mindedly focused on elective surgery targets. The staged reduction of elective surgery ( Table 1) undoubtedly resulted in greater compliance with surgery cancellation required in each escalation stage than would have been the case if a blanket ban on all surgery had been imposed as a single step. The Critical Care Networks were in an ideal position to offer Trusts network-wide and North West-wide perspectives of the crisis, which helped facilitate greater local implementation of the escalation plan than might have been the case if Trusts had based their escalation responses on their own individual experiences.
Although evidence is limited, extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) might be considered an effective treatment option for patients with H1N1 pneumonitisassociated refractory hypoxia. The Specialised Commissioning Team approved an increase in ECMO bed numbers, from five at Glenfield Hospital in Leicester to a total of 27 beds across the UK. In the North West, the Critical Care Networks helped facilitate the allocation of resources from other cardiac surgery centres to support the four newly established ECMO beds at the North West ECMO Centre at the University Hospital of South Manchester.
Despite this, it was considered possible that there may still not be sufficient ECMO capacity to cope with demand during the peak of the H1N1 outbreak. In response to this, the Department of Health recommended that all Strategic Health Authorities identify high-volume general intensive care units Widespread infection and inability to cope with demand. Impossible to plan for. 
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which could act as Advanced Respiratory Centres 1 . The Critical Care Networks were asked to formulate, with these units, local rotas. The functions of these centres included acting as experts in making referrals for ECMO, co-ordination of timely patient repatriations from ECMO centres, being a source of advice on optimisation of oxygenation and ventilation and where possible, organisation of the transfer of patients to Advanced Respiratory Centres for rescue treatments if ECMO was not available. It was anticipated that this would decrease the numbers of inappropriate referrals to ECMO centres and increase ECMO bed availability, as well as improve the outcome of patients who did not receive ECMO, which is consistent with emerging evidence that patients with severe hypoxia have better outcomes when treated in high volume centres. 2, 3 The transfer of patients with refractory hypoxia to either ECMO or Advanced Respiratory Centres is not without risk. The ECMO retrieval team from Glenfield Hospital are experienced in undertaking such transfers but in the North West experience was limited. Therefore the Critical Care Networks and the North West Ambulance Service developed a consultant-based transfer team to undertake these high-risk transfers. During stage 2 of the NHS North West escalation plan during which elective surgery was cancelled, consultant anaesthetists were readily available to support the transfer team. When the escalation status was downgraded and elective surgery recommenced, there was still a need for the transfer team to continue and the availability of participating consultant anaesthetists was ensured by the Critical Care Networks' discussions with their Trusts.
Children were affected in smaller numbers than adults and paediatric critical care bed escalation was not necessary in the North West. Nevertheless the Critical Care Networks monitored paediatric critical care activity and communicated with paediatric critical care medicine colleagues to help ensure preparedness for paediatric critical care bed escalation. In conjunction with local paediatric critical care colleagues the North West Critical Care Networks organised training sessions for staff from adult critical care areas that could have been activated rapidly.
In summary, the North West Critical Care Networks were central to both escalation planning and implementation. The key advantages of the North West' s Network approach resulted largely from the Critical Care Networks' local knowledge and relationships with its stakeholders. These were crucial both in deciding when escalation and de-escalation should occur, and in translating these decisions into practice. Although this is only one of the many functions of Critical Care Networks, this role in itself demonstrates the excellent value offered by Critical Care Networks in today' s financial climate.
